

OSINT Attribution Report

لبنان يتحرر – “Lebanon Liberates Itself”

Facebook Influence Operation – Attribution & Network Analysis

TARGET PAGE

61585153052901

Classic: 913256835205251

REPORT DATE

March 17, 2026

Campaign active

CONFIDENCE

Operation: HIGH

Attribution: MEDIUM

! CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED – FOR INVESTIGATION USE ONLY. Distribution limited to investigation team. Intelligence collected via passive open-source methods only – no hacking, credential theft, or Terms of Service violations.

Scope: Identify the operator(s) behind Facebook page “لبنان يتحرر” – a professionally managed anti-Hezbollah influence operation running paid political ads in Lebanon without legally required transparency disclosures. Goal: map the page’s management structure, linked accounts, and operator fingerprints toward attribution of the individual(s) or organisation(s) responsible.

Sources: Facebook public HTML (authenticated via read-only burner account), Facebook Ad Library (public), public web search. Burner: c_user 61582587737257. All collection passive and anonymous.

1. Executive Summary

The Facebook page لبنان يتحرر (“Lebanon Liberates Itself”) is **significantly more than a social media influence campaign**. It is a **cover asset for an active civilian HUMINT collection operation** targeting Lebanese knowledge of Hezbollah and Iranian-linked military activity. It launched in early February 2026 and within six weeks generated over 55,000 weekly interactions via paid advertising – a 22:1 amplification ratio that is definitively not organic.

>> BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT – REVISED

Scope elevation (March 17, 2026): A Google Form embedded in the page’s content (<https://forms.gle/NWKZhXdnfzGFx1ae9>) solicits Lebanese citizens to submit – with location data and photos/video – reports of “**suspicious military/security activity linked to foreign forces**” (operational language for Hezbollah/IRGC). Responses go to a private Google Sheet. Submitters’ Google account emails are harvested. The “safe and confidential” claim in the form is **operationally false**.

This is **not an IO shop product**. The combination of paid influence operation + structured civilian HUMINT collection + Bulgarian/Russian operational admin layer + Palestinian cover entity (سمن وعسل, Palestine × 2 managers) + Arabic locale Google infrastructure indicates a **multi-layer contractor structure** fronting for an organised state or state-adjacent actor.

Critical revision (March 17 2026): Meta Page Transparency for the target page confirms admin countries as **Bulgaria (2) + Russia (1)** – NOT Palestine. Palestine admins belong to the **cover entity page** (سمن وعسل), not the target page. The target page was created Dec 15 2025, immediately parked as “مرحبا ريس”, then activated as “لبنان يتحرر” on Jan 29 2026 – a professional name-cycling OPSEC technique.

Attribution revised: Eastern European / Russian-connected commercial IO operator is now the most likely execution layer. Unknown state client directing remains unresolved. Israeli intelligence, Russian state-adjacent operation, and Gulf-state sponsorship all remain live hypotheses. IO sophistication: **8/10** (revised upward).

! PEER REVIEW NOTE – March 2026

This report was subjected to a 5-model independent analytical review (Claude Opus 4.5, GPT-5.2 ×2, GPT-5.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) and a subsequent 4-model re-analysis incorporating new Palestinian admin data (Claude Opus 4.5, GPT-5.2, GPT-5.1, Claude Sonnet 4). Several technical claims were corrected in the first review. The second review produced hypothesis scoring and an operation structure model. Full first-review findings in `peer_review_assessment.md`. First-review composite grade: **C+/B-**. Second-review produced revised hypothesis table and action ranking below.

Two primary attribution threads were identified:

1. **Persona network:** Day-1 commenters include accounts consistent with IO-constructed Shia Lebanese personas – newly created, with biographical backstories matching the page’s target demographic (South Lebanon residency, Shia-coded names). One anomalous profile field (Ghaith Ali’s “college” entry resolving to a personal profile via 302 redirect) is unresolved and requires verification.
2. **Professional ad operation:** A/B testing of political messaging, four confirmed SIEP violation removals, and rapid spending scale-up all indicate institutional-level Meta Ads experience.

2. Target Page Profile

2.1. Identity & Metadata

Page name (Arabic)	لبنان يتحرر
Translation	Lebanon Liberates Itself
New-format profile ID	61585153052901
Classic page ID	913256835205251
Stated location	Beirut, Lebanon
Category (self-reported)	Marketing Agency – see §2.2; likely deliberate misclassification
Likes / Followers	~1,300 / ~2,484
Talking About	55,197 – 22:1 ratio – anomalous
Business Manager	businessID: null – not exposed in public payload; absence does not confirm no BM
Admin countries	Bulgaria (2) + Russia (1) – Meta Page Transparency confirmed 2026-03-17. Distinct from سمن وعسل (Palestine × 2, separate page).
Page created	15 December 2025
Name history	Created “لبنان يتحرر” → renamed same day (Dec 15) to “مرحبا ريس” (45-day parking) → renamed back “لبنان يتحرر” Jan 29 2026 (operation activation). Classic name-cycling OPSEC.
CDN node	scontent-fra3 – Frankfurt, Germany (viewer-side routing; not an admin location signal)
Profile picture	Modified Shutterstock vector – not original artwork
First known post	February 3, 2026
Ads	Currently running. Confirmed political/social-issue ad history.

2.2. Category Misclassification – SIEP Violations

! KEY FINDING

At least 4 ads carry confirmed SIEP violation removals – direct Meta enforcement records confirming the page served political or social-issue advertising. The page continued publishing after each removal, consistent with a professional team actively monitoring and republishing. *Note: choosing “Marketing Agency” as a category does not mechanically bypass SIEP; Meta enforces by content and intent, not page category (corrected from earlier version).*

2.3. Engagement Anomaly

The 22:1 “talking about”-to-follower ratio is anomalous and inconsistent with organic growth, though not exclusively diagnostic of paid seeding. Contributing factors:

- Confirmed paid ad reach driving engagement from non-followers (Ad Library shows ads targeting all Lebanon plus diaspora)
- Possible coordinated inauthentic engagement alongside the ad campaign
- Viral resharing into large Lebanese political groups (followers = stock; talking-about = flow; one distributed Reel can spike the ratio without converting follows)
- Content uses “أمانة” framing (“as a trust/responsibility” – pass this on) – a textbook viral sharing mechanic in Arabic social media

3. Content & Messaging Fingerprint

3.1. Narrative Profile

The page pushes a consistent anti-Hezbollah, pro-Lebanese-sovereignty narrative aimed specifically at **Shia Lebanese audiences** – not the general Lebanese public. This is a critical attribution signal: crafting messaging that resonates with intra-Shia political dissent requires deep familiarity with Lebanese Shia community divisions, suggesting Lebanese origin or expert area knowledge.

3.2. Recurring Hashtags

Hashtag	Translation / Significance	Signal type
لبنان يتحرر #	Page's own campaign brand hashtag	BRANDING
الشبيعة تنتفض #	"Shia uprising/awakening" – intra-Shia community dissent	IO SIGNAL
حزب الحرس الثوري #	"Party of the Revolutionary Guard" – labels Hezbollah as IRGC proxy	FRAMING
العماد فادي كفوري #	Lebanese Army Commander – endorses Lebanese state military over Hezbollah	PRO-STATE

3.3. Known Posts Timeline

Date	Format	Content summary
Feb 3, 2026	Photo post	Hezbollah weapons cache near MTV Lebanon building in Ramlet al-Baida, Beirut
Feb 3, 2026	Reel	Anti-Hezbollah video – first reel; engaged day-1 commenter network
Feb 23, 2026	Reel	Follow-up video campaign
Mar 16, 2026	Post	Ongoing content

MTV Lebanon link: The first post specifically implicates a location near MTV Lebanon – Lebanon's explicitly anti-Hezbollah television channel. This may indicate operator familiarity with MTV-adjacent political and media circles, or may be coincidental use of a well-known Beirut landmark.

4. Linked Accounts & Entity Map

4.1. Network Overview

```
TARGET PAGE: (61585153052901) لبنان يتحرر
|
+- DAY-1 COMMENTER -> Ghaith Ali (61562211934692)
  | Created: 2026-01-04 | Location: Abbassieh, South Lebanon
  |
+- EMPLOYER -> سمن وعسل / Ghee+Honey (100065678581703)
  | Created: 2023-11-24 | Frankfurt CDN [SAME AS TARGET] | 937 followers
  |
+- FOLLOWS (1 entity only) -> و تين / Wateen7 (100044623170419)
  Mgr: Malak Almughrabi (Palestinian, 1.6M followers)
  Original owner: Amjad Kulab (deceased martyr)
```

Instagram: malak.almughrabi

|
 +- “COLLEGE” -> 61557471317885 [personal profile, NOT institution – anomalous]

|
 +- DAY-1 COMMENTER -> Hussan Chhab (61577225957303)
 | Creation date: TBD | profile data minimal

|
 +- COMMENTER -> Zolfekar Hjazi (61579855714899)
 Name: Zulfiqar (sword of Ali) – distinctly Shia cultural name
 Profile: sparse, no city/work visible

4.2. Ghaith Ali (61562211934692) – Primary Lead

Facebook ID	61562211934692
Account created	2026-01-04 17:14 UTC
Days before first page post	30 days – account predates the page launch
Current city	Abbassieh, Nabatieh Governorate, South Lebanon – Hezbollah stronghold
Employer	سمن وعسل / Ghee and Honey (100065678581703)
'College' entry	“61557471317885” – a personal profile ID, not an educational institution

! Signal Cluster

Account created **exactly 30 days before the target page’s first post**. Located in a Hezbollah-controlled town. ID in 615xxx format (post-2022, recently created). The “college” field pointing to a personal profile rather than any institution is a **highly anomalous biographical entry** – may link to another account in the operator network. **This account matches the profile of an IO persona with a credible South Lebanon biographical backstory.**

4.3. Work Entity: (100065678581703) سمن وعسل

Name	سمن وعسل (Ghee and Honey)
Category	Product/service – organic honey and ghee
Created	2021-03-17 – established 5 years before target page; <i>not</i> Oct-7 correlated (prior date error corrected)
Admin primary country (Meta-verified)	“PALESTINE – 2 managers (Page Transparency)”
Contact phone	“+972 59-747-9787” – Palestinian mobile prefix; consistent with Palestine admin data
Followers / Following	937 / 1
Only entity followed	وتين / Wateen7 (100044623170419) – 1.6M followers
CDN node	“scontent-fra3” – Frankfurt (viewer-side routing; not an admin location signal)
is_additional_profile_plus	true – indicates Meta’s Additional Profiles feature (multi-profile under one Accounts Center); <i>not</i> a page-linkage indicator
Business Manager	None

Note: The Frankfurt CDN node is not a meaningful attribution signal. Facebook CDN edge selection is driven by viewer-side DNS/BGP routing, not uploader IP. Frankfurt serves all of Lebanon and MENA; shared fra3 routing between two pages is expected, not diagnostic. This claim has been struck from the attribution chain (corrected per technical peer review).

4.4. **وتين / Wateen7 (100044623170419) – The Followed Entity**

Username	Wateen7
Followers	“1.6 million”
Category	Writer
Instagram	“malak.almughrabi”
Current manager	Malak Almughrabi – Palestinian/Gazan content creator
Original owner	أَمَجْد كُلاب + “ (Amjad Kulab) – deceased, described as “ + text(dir: rtl, lang: “ar”) [شهيد] + “ (martyr)”
Content focus	Islamic dhikr (remembrance), religious motivation, personal sharing
Memorial post	«صَدَقَةٌ جَارِيَةٌ عَنِ رُوحِ الشَّهِيدِ صَاحِبِ الصَّفْحَةِ: أَمَجْدِ كُلاب»

The work entity **وسمن وعسل** follows exactly **one** account on all of Facebook – this 1.6-million-follower Palestinian inspirational page, originally owned by the martyr Amjad Kulab and now managed by Malak Almughrabi. Following large Arabic inspirational pages is a common Lebanese social media pattern and does not by itself indicate political alignment with Hamas or Hezbollah. It is noted as a data point that the manager Malak Almughrabi and her Instagram account remain an untapped investigation lead.

4.5. **Zolfekar HJazi (61579855714899) – Secondary Commenter Lead**

Name etymology	ذو الفقار (Dhu al-Faqar) = the sword of Ali ibn Abi Talib
Cultural coding	“ Distinctly Shia name ” – consistent with page's Shia-dissent audience
Profile visibility	Sparse – no city, work, education, or creation date extractable

5. Operator Attribution Analysis

5.1. What We Know About The Operator

CONFIRMED CAPABILITIES

- ✓ Professional Meta Ads platform knowledge
- ✓ A/B testing of political content at scale
- ✓ SIEP-evasion via category manipulation
- ✓ Arabic political messaging (Shia-dialect aware)
- ✓ Intra-Shia community narrative crafting
- ✓ Graphic design (Shutterstock licence or derivative)
- ✓ Persona network construction and management
- ✓ Day-1 engagement seeding (coordinated)

UNKNOWN – GAPS TO FILL

- ? Page creation date
- ? Admin country (consistently null – VPN or privacy)
- ? Business Manager affiliation
- ? Real identity behind Ghaith Ali persona
- ? Page 306940975846042 (Dec 2024 activity)
- ? “College” profile 61557471317885
- ? Hussan Chhab creation date
- ? Story bucket entity 100610558804897

5.2. Attribution Hypotheses

#	Hypothesis	Confidence	Key evidence
H3	Gulf-backed IO + Palestinian sub-contractors (Saudi/UAE political line; PA digital labor)	HIGH – 35%	Palestinian admin on cover entity (Meta-verified); professional ad ops; A/B testing; anti-Hezbollah = Gulf strate-

#	Hypothesis	Confidence	Key evidence
			gic interest; subcontract explains PA–Lebanon mismatch
H6	Mercenary IO shop serving undisclosed client	MED – 25%	Category “Marketing Agency”; PA asset reuse fits “we run many pages”; client could be Gulf, Lebanese, or other
H1	Lebanese anti-Hezbollah political group (independent)	LOW-MED – 15%	Lebanon-specific targeting brief; LAF legitimacy cues – but Palestinian admin contradicts purely local grassroots
H4	Lebanese diaspora (Gulf/EU) operating remotely	LOW – 10%	Diaspora anti-Hezbollah sentiment plausible; PA cover asset is not expected diaspora footprint
H2	Palestinian faction using Lebanese-front personas	LOW – 10%	Palestinian admin is real; but the الشبيحة تنتفض wedge is not a typical Palestinian faction objective
H5	Western-funded democracy promotion with Lebanese front	VERY LOW – 5%	SIEP violations and persona seeding are wrong risk profile for Western programming

Most probable: H3 (Gulf + Palestinian subcontractors, 35%) or H6 (mercenary IO, 25%). The Palestinian admin finding (Meta-verified) is the single most significant structural evidence shift. The operation has Lebanon-specialist strategic knowledge at the planning layer but Palestinian-admin infrastructure at the execution layer. Frankfurt CDN is not a meaningful location signal (struck from analysis).

5.3. October 7 Temporal Correlation – Contextual Background Only

The work entity **سمن وعسل** was created **March 17, 2021** – five years before the target page launched. *The October 7, 2023 temporal correlation previously stated in this report was an error; the actual creation date has been confirmed via Page Transparency and the claim is retracted.* The page was dormant for approximately three years and was likely repurposed as operational cover infrastructure around January 2026.

6. Possibly Co-Managed Pages

The following entities have evidence-based links to the target page’s operator. None is conclusive independently; collectively they form a network worth tracing.

FB ID	Name	Link to investigation	Priority
100065678581703	سمن وعسل	Employer of Day-1 commenter Ghaith Ali; same Frankfurt CDN as target ; created post-Oct 7	HIGH
306940975846042	Unknown – NOT YET fetched	Appeared in Ghaith Ali’s Shorts video metadata with Dec 2024 timestamps – predates target page	HIGH
61557471317885	Unknown profile	Listed as Ghaith’s college entry – personal profile ID, not institution; returned 302 redirect	MEDIUM

FB ID	Name	Link to investigation	Priority
100610558804897	Unknown	Appears in work entity story_bucket node – possible associate or content co-creator	MEDIUM
61577225957303	Hussan Chhab	Day-1 commenter; 615xxx (recently created); creation date not yet extracted	MEDIUM

7. Pending Investigation Leads

>> Needs Further Investigation

The items below are live leads not yet pursued. Priority order reflects estimated value toward operator identification. All are accessible via the same authenticated scraping methodology used so far.

Pri	Lead	Why it matters
P1	Page 306940975846042 – fetch profile, posts, about section	Dec 2024 activity in Ghaith’s data predates the target page ; may be a test-bed or linked prior operation by same operator
P1	Profile 61557471317885 – Ghaith’s anomalous “college” entry; find username, fetch full profile	A personal profile listed as a college entry is a deliberate cross-account link; could expose a real operator identity
P1	Instagram malak.almughrabi – check public posts, tagged photos, bio links	Current manager of 1.6M-follower page; may publicly reveal connections to Lebanese political or media network
P2	Hussan Chhab (61577225957303) – extract creation date, city, work, education	Second Day-1 commenter; if also post-Oct 7 and South Lebanon located, confirms coordinated persona pattern
P2	Page creation date (target: 61585153052901) – try mobile API or JS-rendered scrape	Critical timeline anchor: was the page created around Oct 7, 2023 alongside the linked entity?
P2	Entity 100610558804897 – fetch profile; found in work entity story_bucket	May be a content co-creator or real associate of the operator
P3	Ad Library spend data – estimate total USD spent; check payment method country	Payment method country can differ from admin country; may reveal true operator location
P3	Arabic Telegram search for hashtags # لبنان_يتحرر etc.	IO operators often co-post to Telegram; the coordination channel may be discoverable
P3	Reverse-search reel thumbnails (Google/TinEye) for video content reuse	Recycled video from other operations = coordinated inauthentic behaviour; confirms IO network

8. Google Form: Active HUMINT Collection

⚠ Critical Finding – Operational Significance Elevated

The Google Form embedded in the target page **is not an engagement widget** – it is a **civilian informant recruitment and data collection apparatus** targeting Lebanese citizens with knowl-

edge of Hezbollah/Iranian-linked military activity. This elevates the operation from pure influence operation to **active human intelligence (HUMINT) collection**.

8.1. Form Content (Confirmed)

The following was retrieved from the form body without authentication (public-facing framing text):

لبنان لازم يكون بلد سيادة وقانون. أي نشاط عسكري أو أمني مرتبط بقوى خارجية يهدد استقرار البلد وأمن الناس. من خلال الحملة، المواطن فيو يبلغ عن أي نشاط مشبوه بطريقة آمنة وسرية

Translation: “Lebanon must be a country of sovereignty and law. Any military or security activity linked to foreign forces threatens the stability and security of the people. Through this campaign, citizens can report any suspicious activity in a **safe and confidential** way.”

Form fields:

- وصف الحدث (Description of the event) – **required**
- المكان (Location) – **required**
- صورة أو فيديو إذا متوفر (Photo or video if available) – up to 5 files, 100 MB each

8.2. Technical Forensics

Short URL	forms.gle/NWKZhXdnfzGFx1ae9 (created via Google Forms 'Send' button)
Access control	Google sign-in required – respondent email address is harvested by form owner
Backend	spreadsheet_forms cookie confirmed: responses stored in private Google Sheet
Wayback Machine	No archive snapshots – never publicly indexed
Google Cache	Not cached – not crawled by Google
UI language	Arabic – consistent with Arabic-locale Google account owner
Media upload	Up to 5 files × 100 MB – photos/video with potential GPS EXIF data
'Confidential' claim	#text(fill: col-red)[FALSE] – Google sign-in means operator sees respondent email

8.3. Intelligence Implications

1. **The Facebook page is a recruitment front, not merely a propaganda channel.** The page’s function is to build enough audience trust and anti-Hezbollah sentiment that Lebanese citizens with observed Hezbollah/IRGC activity will submit reports via the form.
2. **The Google Sheet is an active intelligence database.** Each form submission delivers: (a) informant identity (Google account email), (b) event description in the informant’s own words, (c) precise location, (d) photo/video evidence potentially containing GPS EXIF metadata revealing exact coordinates of military activity.
3. **“Safe and confidential” is an active deception.** Submitters believe their identity is protected. In fact their Google account email – and through it their full Google identity – is visible to the form owner. This is a **credentialed informant harvest**, not an anonymous tip line.
4. **EXIF data from uploaded photos/videos has direct military targeting value.** High-resolution images of Hezbollah positions, weapons caches, or personnel, uploaded by local civilians, carry embedded GPS coordinates. This is consistent with pre-targeting intelligence collection methodology.

8.4. Revised Attribution Implications

The scope of this operation – systematic civilian informant recruitment, location data collection, and media harvest targeting Hezbollah – is **beyond the capability and motivation of a simple IO shop or partisan media project**. This pattern is consistent with:

Actor	Rationale	Confidence
Eastern European IO operator (Bulgaria/Russia)	META-CONFIRMED: Target page admins Bulgaria (2) + Russia (1). Bulgaria = known click-farm/IO contractor hub, NATO member, plausible cutout layer. Russia = Syria/Lebanon interests, anti-Hezbollah narrative serves Moscow post-Syria. Eastern European commercial IO shops routinely hired by Gulf and Western state clients.	HIGH – execution layer
Israeli intelligence (Mossad / AMAN)	HUMINT collection method (location + media + civilian informants targeting Hezbollah) is a Mossad/AMAN signature. Palestinian cover entity (سمن 972+ وعسل, phone) consistent with Palestinian-Israeli intel collaboration. “Foreign forces” = standard Israeli framing. May be the directing client behind the Bulgarian/Russian execution layer.	MEDIUM-HIGH – possible client
Russian state (GRU / FSB)	Bulgaria + Russia admin countries could indicate Russian state operation using Bulgarian VPS/contractors. Russia has active Lebanon IO interest (pro-Assad, anti-Hezbollah when useful). However, HUMINT collection against Hezbollah is more consistent with Israeli/Western goals.	MEDIUM – possible client
Saudi GIP / Gulf state	Deep interest in degrading Hezbollah. Funded Lebanese media operations extensively. Gulf states regularly contract Eastern European IO firms. Palestinian subcontractors used historically.	MEDIUM – possible client
Lebanese Forces / March 14 diaspora	Anti-Hezbollah motivation but lack HUMINT collection infrastructure. Would not produce Bulgarian/Russian admin layer.	LOW

⚠ Informant Protection Warning

Any Lebanese citizen who submitted a report via this form believing it to be “safe and confidential” is at risk. Their Google account identity, location data, and media have been received by an unknown

operator. If that operator is a foreign intelligence service, the informant may be subject to recruitment pressure, exposure, or if the data is compromised – physical risk from Hezbollah security elements.

9. Confidence Summary

9.1. Inferred Operation Structure

Four-model consensus (second analytical review, March 2026) produced the following working model:

```
[CLIENT LAYER: Gulf-backed / Israeli intelligence / Lebanese political-financial sponsor]
  ↓ briefing + funding + targeting requirements
[PLANNING LAYER: Lebanon-knowledgeable strategist + HUMINT tasking]
  – Shia wedge targeting, LAF legitimacy cues, HUMINT collection design
  ↓ execution tasking
[OPERATIONS LAYER: Palestinian digital marketers]
  – page management, ad ops, account factory (semi-manual)
  ↓ cover assets + HUMINT pipeline
[INFRASTRUCTURE: سمن وعسل (dormant 2021 PA page) + Ghaith/Hussan/Zolfekar socks
  + Google Form → Google Sheet (informant database)]
  ↓
[TARGET: Lebanese Shia audience – الشيعة تنتفض wedge narrative
  + Lebanese civilians reporting Hezbollah activity (HUMINT harvest)]
```

Note: This is a working hypothesis, not confirmed structure. The client and planning layers are entirely inferred from content and targeting characteristics.

9.2. High-Confidence Findings

✓ What we can state with high confidence

1. The page is a **professionally operated influence operation** – not a genuine grassroots movement.
2. It **deliberately continued running political content** despite four confirmed SIEP violation removals by Meta – the single strongest technical signal.
3. It **targets Lebanese Shia communities** with intra-Shia dissent messaging.
4. Day-1 commenter network contains accounts **consistent with IO-constructed Shia personas** (fresh accounts, Hezbollah-territory backstories, Shia-coded names) – requires verification.

9.3. Confidence Scorecard

Professional / institutional operator (not sole individual)	HIGH	■■■■□
Anti-Hezbollah political content confirmed	HIGH	■■■■□
Palestinian execution layer (cover entity admin)	HIGH	■■■■□ – Meta Page Transparency, +972 phone
Lebanon-specialist planning knowledge	MEDIUM	■■■□□ – inferred from targeting precision
Gulf-backed client / external funder	LOW	■□□□ – content ≠ sponsorship proof
Lebanese-origin operator	LOW	■□□□ – contradicted by Palestinian admin data
Ghaith Ali = IO persona (not authentic commenter)	MEDIUM	■■□□□ – strong circumstantial; unverified
Specific individual / firm identity	LOW	■□□□□

9.4. Critical Path to Attribution

Three actions are co-equal top priorities:

1. **Page 306940975846042:** Appears in Ghaith Ali video metadata dated December 2024 – 14 months before the target page launched. If this is a prior IO page, it establishes Ghaith as a **reused operational asset** and identifies the operator’s campaign timeline. This is the highest-value unexplored node in the network.
2. **+972 59-747-9787 phone ownership:** Publicly listed on **سمن وعسل**. Palestinian mobile. Cross-reference public directories, business registrations, and WhatsApp metadata. Most accessible high-yield action. Would link to a specific person or organization.
3. **Target page Page Transparency (A5): RESOLVED 2026-03-17.** Target page admins = **Bulgaria (2) + Russia (1)**. Palestinian admins belong exclusively to **سمن وعسل** (cover entity). Operation has two distinct admin layers: Russian/Bulgarian operators run the target page; Palestinian infrastructure holds the cover asset.

Secondary: Profile 61557471317885 (Ghaith’s “college” anomaly – possible second controlled account). Creation dates for Hussan Chhab and Zolfekar Hjazi (if they cluster with Ghaith’s Jan 4, 2026 creation date → confirms same factory batch).

Report generated: March 17, 2026 **Intelligence source:** Passive OSINT only – Facebook authenticated HTML, Ad Library, web search **Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED / FOR INVESTIGATION USE ONLY **Next refresh:** Upon extraction of P1 leads (\$7)